According to the “B-theory” of time, the present is not objectively privileged. All moments are on a par; ‘present’ is just an indexical term referring to the time at which it is uttered (compare ‘here’); reality is a four-dimensional “block universe”, in which past, present, and future entities and facts are co-equal.

The various “A-theories”, on the other hand, privilege the present, each in its own way. According to presentism, only present entities and facts are real. According to the growing block theory, only past and present entities and facts are real. According to the moving spotlight theory, past and future entities and facts are real, but present entities and facts have a further, irreducible quality of presentness—the “spotlight”.

Or rather, that’s what the traditional moving spotlight theory says. But Ross P. Cameron has now introduced a new spotlight theory that combines aspects of presentism, the usual spotlight theory, and even the B-theory. The main elements of the theory are these: (1) Past and future entities exist, and have four-dimensional locations in spacetime. This is like the usual spotlight theory, and the B-theory. (2) The properties and relations had by objects are those they have now. This is like presentism, and unlike the usual spotlight theory. (3) There are no fundamental (past- or future-) tensed facts. This is like the B-theory, and unlike most other A-theories.

The simultaneous acceptance of (2) and (3) is striking. Accepting (3) requires saying that a tensed claim like “I was once four feet tall” is made true by tenseless facts. Which tenseless facts? The B theorist’s answer is familiar: the fact that I am (tenselessly) four feet tall with respect to certain times before the time of the utterance. But this answer appeals to the properties I have at past times, which requires rejecting (2).

In fact, Cameron has an ingenious story to tell about what underwrites true statements about the past. The core of the story has two parts, antireductionism about temporal distributional properties, and antireductionism about ages. A temporal distributional property is a property that, intuitively, concerns the sequence and arrangement of intrinsic properties that a thing possesses over time. The point of speaking of temporal distributional properties is to

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*Thanks to Ross Cameron, Dan Deasy, and Ned Markosian for comments.
1We have McTaggart (1908) to thank for the “A”/“B” terminology (and more).
deny the common-sense order of dependence: whereas we usually think that I possess the temporal distributional property of first-being-four-feet-and-then-being-five-feet-nine-inches because of my possessing the nondistributional property of being four feet tall in the past, followed by my possessing the nondistributional property of being five-nine, Cameron instead claims that I possess these nondistributional properties successively because I possess the distributional property. Better: I possess these nondistributional properties successively because I possess a certain maximal temporal distributional property: the one that completely specifies my qualitative nature over my entire existence. Cameron similarly denies a commonsensical reductionism about ages: whereas we usually assume that I am fifty years old because the time at which I was born is fifty years before the present moment, Cameron regards the fact that I am fifty years old as a fundamental fact; for him, which moment is present is determined by the ages of all objects.

Given these two claims, Cameron can then say what makes tensed statements true. I was once four feet tall, according to Cameron, because of two facts: the fact that I have a certain temporal distributional property, and the fact that I am fifty years old. Intuitively: my possession of the distributional property fixes the temporal sequence of my possession of intrinsic properties, and my being fifty years old fixes where we are now in that sequence, which implies that the four-feet-tall point in the sequence is past. Those same two facts also make true, according to Cameron, statements about the present: I am five feet nine inches (present tense) because I have the distributional property that I do (which fixes my qualitative sequence) and because I am fifty years old (which fixes which slice of this sequence is the current one).

This works for tensed claims about properties that are fixed by temporal distributional properties (such as heights), but what about tensed claims about ages? What makes it the case that I was once eight years old? The fact that I am in fact fifty years old, according to Cameron. My age, in fact, makes true all of the facts about which ages I had in the past and will have in the future.

As I say, this is an ingenious story, but I want to raise three concerns. First: is the account sufficiently distinct from the B-theory to fit the usual A-theorist’s tastes and arguments? A-theorists are united by their opposition to the B-theorist’s conception of time, which they regard as “static” and unacceptably diminishing the importance of the present. Now, one concern about the traditional moving spotlight theory has always been that its vision of time isn’t different enough from the B-theory’s. The traditional spotlight theory includes all the facts the B-theorist accepts, and while it does tack on a fact about which
moment is present (and usually also a set of fundamental tensed facts about the past and future locations of the privileged present), that’s the only difference. So the only distinctively A-theoretic part of the traditional spotlight view concerns the existence (and motion) of the spotlight. Its intrinsic conception of objects in time (of their nature and how they change), setting aside time itself, is purely B-theoretic.²

A similar concern can be raised about Cameron’s view. Cameron’s facts about which past and future entities exist, about what their four-dimensional locations are, and about what their temporal distributional properties are, do not vary over time and completely specify the four-dimensional history of objects and their possession of properties and relations.³ Thus these facts are akin to the B-theorist’s facts. (Indeed, B-theorists like Josh Parsons who embrace fundamental temporal distributional properties accept pretty much exactly these facts.⁴) It is only the irreducible ages that distinguish Cameron’s universe from a B-theoretic one. But the ages’ function is analogous to the function of the spotlight in the traditional spotlight view: the sole purpose of the ages is to determine where we are now in the sequences of intrinsic properties determined by temporal distributional properties. Thus ages, like the spotlight, would seem to be the sole morsel of A in an otherwise B-ish universe.

Cameron addresses this concern. First, he insists that distributional properties are possessed by objects now. (Similarly, he says that objects have their four-dimensional locations in spacetime now.) But objects do not change their temporal distributional properties over time, and temporal distributional properties do not have argument places for times. The current time doesn’t seem particularly involved in the fact that, for example, I am four-feet-tall-before-

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²As Deasy (2015, 2078–9) points out, a traditional spotlight theorist will naturally understand an ordinary tensed claim about an object as partially concerning the spotlight. For me to have been four feet tall is for me to be four feet tall at some moment on which the spotlight once shone. Likewise, ordinary claims about change also partially concern the spotlight: I have grown from four feet to five-nine because I am four feet at a moment on which the spotlight once shone, and am five-nine at a moment on which the spotlight currently shines. But such mixed facts “factor” into a tenseless part about objects and a tensed part about the spotlight. By speaking of the spotlight theory’s “intrinsic” conception of objects, I mean to be singling out the first part of this factorization. (See also the discussion below of the “de re” and “de dicto” readings of ‘present intrinsic nature’.)

³Except for objects with infinite pasts and futures, as we will see.

⁴It was Parsons (2004) who introduced distributional properties and pointed out the theoretical significance of antireductionism about them.
So it is hard to see what the difference is between saying that these properties are had “eternally” or “atemporally” (which is how B-theorists tend to describe their unchanging attributions of properties) and saying that they’re had now, as Cameron says. Suppose you picked up a temporal distributional property from a B-theoretic world and dropped it into Cameron’s world. What about it, or the facts about its instantiation, would change?

Second, Cameron would say, I think, that ages are not merely tacked on to an otherwise B-theoretic account because ages play an integral role in making-true statements about objects’ intrinsic properties. He says, of an imagined entity “Flatty”, that “…both its age and its temporal distributional property contribute to Flatty’s present intrinsic nature, since it is in virtue of instantiating them both that it is now intrinsically the way it is…” (2015, p. 138). But there is a sort of de re/de dicto ambiguity in ‘present intrinsic nature’. Suppose that time $t$ is in fact present, and that Flatty’s intrinsic nature at $t$ is $I$. Flatty’s maximal temporal distributional property determines that Flatty possesses a certain series of instantaneous intrinsic natures over time, Flatty’s four-dimensional location then determines that Flatty is $I$ at $t$, and then, finally, Flatty’s age determines that $t$ is the present moment. Thus Flatty’s age is “de dicto relevant” to Flatty’s present intrinsic nature in that it is needed to determine which of Flatty’s instantaneous natures is present—it is needed to determine that Flatty is $I$ at the moment that is present (which moment is, in fact, $t$). But it is “de re irrelevant” to that nature because it is not needed to determine that Flatty is $I$ at $t$ (the moment that is in fact present); the latter fact is determined solely by Flatty’s maximal temporal distributional property and four-dimensional location. The situation with the spotlight is parallel: the spotlight is needed to secure my present intrinsic nature in the de dicto sense of securing what my nature is at the present time, but not in the de re sense of securing what my nature is at a certain time $t$, which is in fact the present time. Thus ages really are like the spotlight in that their sole function is to pick out the present portion of the block universe.

The second concern is whether Cameron delivers a sufficiently robust conception of change. One of the primordial complaints about the B theory is McTaggart’s, which is that the facts it recognizes, facts such as that I am five

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5In the passage I’m about to quote Cameron is actually discussing a different issue, but I believe he would make the same point in the present context.

6Assuming that Flatty isn’t everlasting; see below.

7See also Deasy (2016b, pp. 475–7).
feet nine inches tall in 2017, or that I am four feet tall before I am five-nine, do not change. Recognizing genuine change, it is said, requires recognizing changeable facts, such as the fact that I am five feet nine inches tall. (Five-nine simpliciter, that is, not merely five-nine relative to 2017, or relative to previously being four feet tall.) Moreover, change in such facts, according to the usual story, consists in part of past- or future-tensed facts: though I am five-nine, I was four-even.

At the nonfundamental level, Cameron does accept genuine change in this sense. I am five-nine; I was four-even. (In each case, in virtue of my maximal temporal distributional property and age.) But when we look at the fundamental level, Cameron’s account seems too B-theoretic for the usual A-theorist’s tastes and arguments.

Cameron recognizes three categories of fundamental fact: facts about the possession of temporal distributional properties, facts about four-dimensional locations, and facts about ages. Facts in the first two categories do not change. Facts in the third category do change, but the facts that constitute their change, namely tensed facts such as that I once was eight years old, are not fundamental according to Cameron, since he rejects fundamental tensed facts. The fact that I once was eight years old, the fact that I once was nine years old, and indeed, all tensed facts about my age are made true by my current age, the fact that I am fifty. Fundamentally speaking, we only have a fact about what age I have, and no facts about what ages I did or will have. For many A-theorists, I suspect, this account will seem too static at the fundamental level.

Compare the traditional spotlight view. Its only genuinely changing fundamental fact is a fact about absolute presentness: the fact that the spotlight is located in 2017. Now, what of the fundamentality of the facts that constitute the change in this fact—tensed facts such as that the spotlight was located in 2016, will be located in 2018, and so forth? If the spotlight theorist accepts fundamental tensed facts then such genuine-change-constituting-facts could themselves be regarded as fundamental. But suppose the traditional spotlight theorist rejects fundamental tensed facts, and instead gives reductive truth conditions for tensed statements about where the spotlight was and will be:  

\textbf{Definition of the spotlight’s motion} The spotlight was, (will-be,) at time $t = df t$ is the time $n$ units of time before (after) the time at which the

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8See Sider (2011, sections 11.4–11.9) on this argument, including the operative notion of fact.

9Deasy (2015) defends an account along these lines.
spotlight is in fact located

(“Was” is the metrical tense operator “it was the case n units of time ago that”; similarly for “will”). Then no genuine-change-constituting facts would be embraced at the fundamental level.

The second approach is like Cameron’s in that it rejects fundamental change-constituting facts. Nevertheless Cameron objects to it. He speaks of the spotlight according to such a view as being “stuck” on the present moment. The reductive truth conditions merely allow us to say that the spotlight moves, whereas “We want the spotlight to really move: we want how reality is itself to be subject to change, not merely to reconcile the truth of tensed talk with a fundamentally static reality.” (2015, p. 85) But haven’t we just seen that Cameron’s own view implies that reality is fundamentally static?

Cameron doesn’t think so; here is what he says:

For the stuck spotlighter, to say that another time will be present is just a way of speaking, not reflective of anything in the metaphysics. Nothing would be lost—you would not do a worse job of describing reality—if you did not adopt the fancy semantics [i.e. the reductive truth conditions suggested above] and simply gave a tenseless description of reality, saying what there is, and what things are like, including that one time is (tenselessly) present. By contrast, in saying that things were a certain way, my moving spotlighter is saying something about the very nature of things. It is of the essence of things that have such-and-such a temporal distributional property and so-and-so an age that they are a certain way now, but it is also of the essence of things that have those properties that they were and will be some other way. (2015, pp. 167-8)

And why is it “of the essence” of something with a certain temporal distributional property and age to have a certain tensed profile? Because the former facts make the latter facts true, and truthmakers are facts from whose essence the made-true facts flow (2015, p. 124). Thus Cameron’s account is alleged to be superior to the “stuck spotlight view”, even though the genuine-change-constituting tensed facts are underwritten by nontensed facts, because the “underwriting” in Cameron’s case is of a truthmaker-theoretic variety, so that it’s of the essence of nontensed facts to produce tensed facts.

Now, one point to make here is that a standard spotlight theorist could say the same thing. Instead of regarding her truth conditions governing the motion of the spotlight as a “fancy semantics”, she could instead regard them
as concerning truthmaking. That is, she could cross out ‘$\equiv_{df}$’ in her definition of the spotlight’s motion, and replace it with ‘is made true by’:

**Truthmakers of the spotlight’s motion** [The fact that] the spotlight was, (will-be), at time $t$, $\equiv_{df}$ is made true by [the fact that] $t$ is the time $n$ units before (after) the time at which the spotlight is in fact located

Thus, following Cameron, she would be saying that it’s of the essence of the spotlight that it once shone on 2016 if it shines on 2017. Cameron’s response, therefore, does not depend on the structural differences between his account and the traditional spotlight theory. It rather depends on a claim about truthmaking: that the shift from definition to truthmaking in the account of nonfundamental change in presentness makes all the difference as to whether the account allows for genuine change.

Can this shift make such a profound difference? The facts about truthmaking are surely not themselves fundamental facts. So even if it’s of the essence of Cameron’s facts about ages to make true tensed facts constituting their change, so that such facts are not “just a way of speaking”, but rather reflect something “in the metaphysics”, it would seem that they reflect nothing at the fundamental level. At the fundamental level we have just the B-ish portion of Cameron’s account (facts about temporal distributional properties and four-dimensional locations), plus a set of facts about the ages of things as they are in 2017. Put another way: Cameron cannot admit a difference at the fundamental level between a world in which ages change and a world in which all ages are “stuck”, just as the stuck spotlight theorist cannot.

But perhaps Cameron could respond that the facts about ages themselves constitute change at the fundamental level. To be sure, there are no further fundamental facts constituting the change in ages beyond those facts themselves. But since it’s of the essence of facts about ages to make true facts about the past and future possession of ages, the presence of those very facts amounts to there being change at the fundamental level. The difference between a Cameronian world (in which there is genuine change) and an otherwise similar but “stuck” world is simply the identities of the age properties. In the former world the ages are imbued with change, so to speak—their essences are such as to ground facts about their past possession—whereas in the second world the “ages” are not thus imbued with change.

\[10\] Perhaps the essence of tense is also relevant.
In defense of this stance, it might be argued that many other A-theorists will want to adopt a similar stance. We were led to consider this stance by Cameron’s i) antireductionism about ages and ii) reductionism about tense. But these are the realizers in his system of i) antireductionism about presentness, and ii) reductionism about change in presentness, which many other A-theorists will want to accept: all A-theorists are (in some sense) antireductionist about presentness; and because of the “automaticity” of change in presentness, many will be tempted to reduce such change—if you know which moment is absolutely present (in addition to all the B-facts), you thereby know which moments were or will be absolutely present in any given amount of time.\footnote{Compare Fine (2005, p. 287)}

To see how this plays out in one other case, consider how presentists account for changes in the tensed facts. Suppose I played basketball an hour ago, so that the presentist accepts:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_1B & \quad (P) \\
(P_1 \text{ is the metrical past-tensed operator “it was the case one hour ago that”}).
\end{align*}
\]

The change in the tensed fact that (P)—the presentist’s version of the receding into the past of the event of my playing basketball—amounts to the existence of further tensed facts, such as the fact that it was the case two hours ago that I would play basketball in one hour, and the fact that it will be the case in one hour that I was playing basketball two hours ago:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_2F_1B & \quad (PF) \\
F_1P_2B & \quad (FP)
\end{align*}
\]

But now, notice that many presentists will want to say that (PF) and (FP) derive from (P). For it is natural (though not inevitable\footnote{A presentist who preferred metaphysical semantics (Sider, 2011, chapter 7) to ground and truthmaking would be well-placed to resist the argument at this point.}) to say that facts expressed...
by sentences with iterated tense operators (such as (PF) and (FP)) are never fundamental, but rather derive from facts that are expressed by sentences with a single metric tense operator (such as (P)). On this view, for a tensed fact (like the fact that (P)) to change boils down to nothing more than that very fact holding. So for this sort of presentist, there is a sense in which there is no change at the fundamental level for tensed facts.\textsuperscript{13} Even though some tensed facts are fundamental, and even though such facts do change, the facts that constitute their change (recall (PF) and (FP)) are nonfundamental. One might then ask what at the fundamental level distinguishes a universe like our own, in which the tensed facts change, from a universe in which the tensed facts are “stuck” at those that held in 2017. But the presentist may well reply—to complete the comparison with Cameron—that it’s in the nature of the tensed facts that they’re \textit{not} stuck. It’s of the nature of the fact that (P), for example, to make the facts expressed by (PF) and (FP) true. More generally, the natures of tensed facts ensure that they make true a network of tensed facts that constitute change in the tensed facts.

Perhaps presentists—and other A-theorists who accept i) and ii)—can do no better than this stance; so perhaps by doubling down on his essentialist claim about facts about ages, Cameron is in no worse of a position than many fellow A-theorists. Fair enough; but given what we’ve learned about Cameron’s facts about age and the presentist’s primitive tenses, Cameron’s disavowal of fundamental tensed facts would seem to diminish in importance. For in their place he accepts facts that share the underlying feature of having a putative essence that constitutes “genuine change” of that mysterious sort prized by A-theorists. If there is an important difference between the two claims about essence, we need to be told what it is.

The third concern is that Cameron’s story about the truthmakers for tensed property attributions apparently breaks down for objects with infinite pasts. His story, recall, about what makes it the case that an object was \textit{F} a certain amount of time \textit{a} in the past, is this: the object’s maximal temporal distributional property determines the sequence of its properties over time, and its age determines which member of that sequence is present, which in turn determines which member of the sequence is located at amount \textit{a} in the past. The problem is that the age of an object with an infinite past is either not well-defined, or else is infinite, which would not let us determine which member of the sequence is

\textsuperscript{13}Changes in \textit{nontensed} facts are different: even a presentist who reduces iterated tense is free, for instance, to say that both a nontensed fact \(F\) and the tensed fact \(\neg P_1 F\) are fundamental.
the present one. Cameron points out that if such objects have finite futures the approach could be reinstated: “age” could be reconstrued as time remaining rather than time elapsed. But what of objects with both infinite pasts and futures?

Cameron addresses this; he says:

…just pick an arbitrary time—1980, for example—and think of the age of things as giving the distance from that time: an age of -10 years putting things 10 years before 1980 and an age of +10 years putting things 10 years after. (2015, p. 143)

But it just isn’t clear how this is supposed to work. For an entity with no beginning and no end, what does “the distance from” 1980 mean? The Cameronian age property had by an object is, intuitively, the distance between the present moment and…something. That something can be the object’s first moment if it has one, or its last moment if it has one. But for an object with neither, what is that something?

Each object has a maximal distributional property, which determines the sequence (with a temporal ordering and metric) of the object’s momentary intrinsic descriptions. The object’s “age”, however construed, is supposed to identify one of the members of the sequence as the object’s present description.

Consider the maximal temporal distributional property \( p \) of a two-way infinitely temporally long lamp, which alternates between being red and green in color each minute, for all time. Suppose we’re told that this lamp’s “age” is 17 minutes. In some sense, the lamp is now exactly 17 minutes after (the first moment of) 1980. Is there any way of understanding what that statement means for which learning the statement would tell us whether the lamp is currently red or green? It would seem not.

Incidentally, the problem here isn’t just that the Cameronian facts fail to determine the A-facts (such as the fact of which moment is absolutely present). Even the B-facts aren’t all determined in worlds with multiple everlasting objects, since the properties of such objects cannot be “temporally aligned”. Suppose there are two temporally infinite lamps with property \( p \). Thus each alternates eternally between red and green. Not only are we unable to determine which colors the lamps are now, we also cannot determine the tenseless fact of whether the lamps flash in or out of sync. (I am assuming that the color of a lamp at a time makes no difference to its spatial location then.) Consider two possible worlds each containing just these lamps, one in which the lamps are in sync, so that the lamps have the same color at every time, and another in which
they’re out of sync, so that each lamp is red whenever the other is green. These worlds share the same objects, the objects have the same four-dimensional locations and distributional properties, and we have been given no conception of ages under which the facts about ages would distinguish the worlds.  

As we saw earlier, the Cameronian age of an object can be thought of as the distance between the present moment and...something. The problem is determining what that something is, if the object is everlasting. But what if the something is one of the object’s temporal parts? Let R be a certain (instantaneous) temporal part—a red one, say—of an everlasting lamp with property p. The age of the lamp, thought of as the temporal distance of the present from R, would determine the current color of the lamp. For instance, since the lamp alternates between red and green each minute, if the present is one minute after R then the lamp is green, but if it is two minutes after R then the lamp is red. Cameron himself rejects the metaphysics of temporal parts, but could a Cameronian friend of temporal parts solve the problem of everlasting objects this way?

The arbitrariness of the choice of R would seem to be unattractive. Cameron, however, responds to the apparent arbitrariness in his original proposal to think of objects’ ages as “distance from” some arbitrarily chosen time:

> It makes no difference whether we think of age as distance from 1980 and describe the age of things in the year 2000 as being 20 years after time t or whether we think of age as distance from 2050 and think of the age of things in 2000 as being fifty years before t. These are just two ways of thinking about exactly the same property. (2015, p. 143)

The response, taken as a defense of the temporal parts proposal, is that age properties are coarse-grained in a certain way. Where A is the age property

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14 Notice that it is only for everlasting objects that ages are needed to secure the totality of the world’s tenseless qualitative facts. If an object has a temporal beginning or end, its temporal distributional properties together with its four-dimensional location will determine what it’s intrinsically like at each moment; this is because, intuitively, the temporal distributional property determines a sequence of intrinsic natures at times, and that sequence can only be fit into a temporally bounded object’s four-dimensional location in one way.

15 At a certain point Cameron seems to shift from considering everlasting objects to considering everlasting time; and it may be that his talk of “the distance from 1980” is directed at the latter. For example, the age of spacetime itself could be understood, via the temporal parts strategy, as the distance from the present to an arbitrarily selected temporal part of spacetime, such as 1980. In any case, it is everlasting objects, not everlasting time, that poses a problem for Cameron’s theory.
that the lamp has (i.e., has now), the fact that the lamp has age property \( A \) can be thought of in different ways, each way consisting of a temporal part of the lamp and a distance from that temporal part. Supposing \( R \) to be located two minutes in the past, \( A \) can be thought of as corresponding to \( R \) and the temporal distance two minutes: the lamp’s possessing \( A \) makes it the case that the present moment is two minutes after \( R \). But where \( G \) is the lamp’s temporal part exactly one minute after \( R \) (and thus, the one that is located one minute ago in the past), \( A \) also corresponds to \( G \) and the temporal distance one minute: the present is 1 minute after \( G \). Similarly, for any other temporal part \( T \) of the lamp, \( A \) corresponds to \( T \) and a certain temporal distance (namely, the distance, positive or negative, between \( T \) and the present).

It’s hard to form a clear conception of what such a property is. But perhaps more importantly: just as the lamp’s possession of \( A \) can be construed both as the present’s being two minutes after \( R \) and as the present’s being one minute after \( G \), so it can also be construed as the present’s being 0 minutes after \( T \), the lamp’s current temporal part. But then, it would seem, we could also construe the possession of \( A \) by the lamp as amounting, more simply, to the fact that \( T \) is present.

One minute ago, the lamp had a different age property, \( A^{-1} \). For reasons like those just given, the lamp’s possession then of \( A^{-1} \) can be construed as \( G \)’s then being present. Similarly, the lamp’s possession two minutes ago of \( A^{-2} \) can be construed as \( R \)’s then being present, and so on for all the age properties had over time by the lamp.

So the proposal in effect is that for every time, each thing has a fundamental property whose instantiation amounts to exactly one of that thing’s temporal parts being present. Notice the similarity between this conception of presentness and that of the traditional spotlight theorist. But there are two differences. One is that the traditional spotlight theorist has a single big spotlight, whereas according to the proposal, there are many tiny spotlights, one for each object. The other is that the traditional spotlight is a single property, which is successively possessed by different times, whereas according to the proposal, each tiny spotlight fragments further: for any object, the possessed property changes over time (\( A, A^{-1}, A^{-2}, \ldots \) are all different properties). Viewed in this light, one might prefer the simpler proposal of the standard spotlight theorist.
References


