

FRANKFURT'S COMPATIBILISM

Ted Sider, Metaphysics

1. SOME CONCEPTS

want: a desire, which need not be effective

will: an effective desire — the desire that succeeds in producing action

first-order desire: a desire to do a certain thing

second-order desire: a desire to have a first order desire

second-order volition: a wanting that something be your will

2. THE WANTON (someone who doesn't care what desires s/he is moved by — i.e., someone with no second-order volitions)

3. FREEDOM OF ACTION AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL

It seems to me both natural and useful to construe the question of whether a person's will is free in close analogy to the question of whether an agent enjoys freedom of action. Now freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants. (Frankfurt, p. 15).

[Suppose that a person] enjoys both freedom of action and freedom of the will. Then he is not only free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to want what he wants to want. It seems to me that he has, in that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or to conceive. (Frankfurt, p. 17)

A Frankfurtian Theory:

- i) A person had *freedom of action* (with respect to act A) when she did A, and her will was to do A, but if she had willed to do something else, she would have done something else
- ii) A person had *freedom of the will* (with respect to willing W) when her will was W, and her second-order will was to have will W, but if she had second-order willed to will something else, she would have willed something else
- iii) A person is *free* (with respect to act A and will W) when she did A as the result of will W, and she had *both* freedom of action and freedom of the will (with respect to A and W, respectively)

4. FRANKFURT VS. HOBART