1. The Afterlife: A Problem

How could God create an afterlife in which I myself exist, as opposed to someone merely like me existing? Some possible answers:

(a) similarity
(b) particles
(c) soul
(d) memory

2. The Core Problem of Personal Identity

A person, P, existing at \( t_1 \), is identical to a person, Q, existing at some later time, \( t_2 \), if and only if . . .

For example:

... if and only if P at \( t_1 \) and Q at \( t_2 \) have the same physical appearance

... if and only if P at \( t_1 \) and Q at \( t_2 \) have the same particles as parts

... if and only if P at \( t_1 \) and Q at \( t_2 \) have the same soul

... if and only if Q remembers at \( t_2 \) things that happened to P at \( t_1 \)

3. Identity

(a) Identity is an equivalence relation

\textbf{reflexive:} for every x, \( x=x \)

\textbf{symmetric:} for every x and y, if \( x=y \) then \( y=x \)

\textbf{transitive:} for every x, y, and z, if \( x=y \) and \( y=z \), then \( x=z \)

(b) Numerical identity vs. qualitative similarity
4. **Leibniz’s Law; Identity and Change**

**Leibniz’s Law:** If \( x=y \), then for every property, \( P \), \( x \) has \( P \) if and only if \( y \) has \( P \)

Abbreviations:

“longhair” for “the person who walked into the salon with long hair”

“shorthair” for “the person who left the salon with short hair”

*The argument from change*

(i) If longhair = shorthair, then for every property \( P \), longhair has \( P \) iff shorthair has \( P \)

(ii) Longhair has the property *having long hair*, whereas shorthair does not have this property

(iii) Therefore, longhair \( \neq \) shorthair

5. **Another Way of Looking at Identity over Time: Temporal Stages**

Two stages stand in the *unity relation* for persons if and only if: there is some person of which both are stages

Person stages \( x \) and \( y \) stand in the unity relation for persons if and only if ...

...