

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

Ted Sider, Metaphysics

1. THE PRINCE AND THE COBBLER

...should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon deserted by his own soul, everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions. (John Locke, quoted in Shoemaker, p. 302)

Before-Prince: the person in the prince's body before the swap

Before-Cobbler: the person in the cobbler's body before the swap

After-Prince: the person in the prince's body after the swap (has the Before-Cobbler's psychology)

After-Cobbler: the person in the cobbler's body after the swap (has the Before-Prince's psychology)

The Prince and the Cobbler objection to the Body and Brain theories

- (i) After-Cobbler is neither brain- nor body-continuous with Before-Prince
- (ii) If (i) is true, and if either the brain theory or the body theory is true, then After-Cobbler \neq Before-Prince
- (iii) After-Cobbler is responsible for Before-Prince's crimes
- (iv) If (iii), then After-Cobbler = Before-Prince
- (v) Therefore, both the brain-theory and the body-theory are false

2. LOCKE'S MEMORY THEORY

Person P1 and later person P2 are *directly memory-connected* iff P2 remembers something that P1 did

Locke's theory: Person P1 = later person P2 iff P1 and P2 are directly memory-connected

3. REFINEMENTS TO LOCKE'S THEORY

- (a) The brave officer argument

A boy is flogged at school, takes a standard from an enemy in his first campaign, and is later made a general. When he takes the standard he remembers the flogging; when he is made general he remembers taking the standard but doesn't remember the flogging.

- (i) The boy is directly memory-connected with the standard-taker, who is directly memory-connected with the general; but the boy is not directly memory-connected with the general
- (ii) If (i) and Locke's theory are true, then the boy = the standard-taker, and the standard-taker = the general, but the boy \neq the general
- (iii) Identity is transitive; i.e., for any x, y, and z, if $x=y$ and $y=z$ then $x=z$
- (iv) Therefore, Locke's theory is false

Person P1 and later person P2 are *memory-continuous* iff they are connected by a chain of directly memory-connected persons

The Modified Lockean theory: Person P1 = later person P2 iff P1 is memory-continuous with P2

(b) Butler's circularity objection

One should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. (Bishop Butler, quoted by Shoemaker, p. 302)

Person P1 is *directly memory-connected* with later person P2 iff P2 has an *apparent* memory that matches some event that happened to P1

P1 is *directly memory-connected* with P2 iff P2 has an *apparent* memory that matches and was (appropriately) caused by some event that happened to P1

(c) Amnesia

Person P1 and later person P2 are *directly psychologically connected* iff P1 and P2 are directly memory-connected, or P2's personality and character traits are similar to, and (appropriately) caused by, those of P1

Person P1 and later person P2 are *psychologically continuous* iff they are connected by a chain of directly psychologically connected persons

Psychology theory: Person P1 = later person P2 iff P1 and P2 are psychologically continuous

4. THE DUPLICATION ARGUMENT

Both Charles and Robert come to be psychologically continuous with a past person, Guy Fawkes.

The human brain has two very similar hemispheres — a left and a right hemisphere. The left hemisphere plays a major role in the control of limbs of and processing of sensory information from the right side of the body (and from the right sides of the two eyes); and the right hemisphere plays a major role in the control of limbs of and processing of sensory information from the left side of the body (and from the left sides of the two eyes). The left hemisphere plays a major role in the control of speech. Although the hemispheres have different roles in the adult, they interact with each other; and if parts of a hemisphere are removed, at any rate early in life, the roles of those parts are often taken over by parts of the other hemisphere. . . It might be possible one day to remove a whole hemisphere, without killing the person. (Swinburne, pp. 322-323)

The Duplication argument (first half)

- (i) In the split brain case, the person before the operation is both brain- and psychologically continuous with two distinct people after the operation
- (ii) If (i) is true, and either the brain-theory or the psychology-theory is true, then the person before the operation is identical with two distinct persons
- (iii) For any x , y , and z , if $x=z$ and $y=z$ then $x=y$
- (iv) Therefore, neither the brain theory nor the psychology theory is true

The Modified Psychology theory: person P1 is identical to a later person P2 iff i) P1 is psychologically continuous with P2, and ii) there is no person other than P2 at the later time with which P1 is psychologically continuous

The Modified Brain Theory: person P1 is identical to a later person P2 iff i) P1 and P2 are brain continuous, and ii) there is no other person other than P2 at the later time with which P1 is brain continuous

Suppose P₁'s left hemisphere is transplanted into some skull and the transplant takes. Then, according to the theory, whether the resulting person is P₁, i.e., whether P₁ survives, will depend on whether the other transplant takes place. . . So whether I survive an operation will depend on what happens in a body entirely different from the body which will be mine, if I do survive. But how can who I am depend on what happens to you? (Swinburne, pp. 323-324)

Cases 1 and 2: an original person, Ted, has his brain split, and put into two clones of Ted's body, Fred and Ed. In each case, the left hemisphere of Ted is successfully transplanted into a resulting person, Fred. In Case 1, the second operation is also a success, and Ed lives, whereas in Case 2, the right hemisphere disintegrates and Ed dies.

The Duplication argument (second half)

- (i) In both Case 1 and Case 2, Ted is brain- and psychologically continuous with Fred
- (ii) In Case 1 but *not* Case 2, Ted is brain- and psychologically continuous with Ed
- (iii) If (i) and (ii) are true, and either the Modified Brain Theory or the Modified Psychology Theory is true, then Ted survives the operation in Case 2, but not in Case 1
- (iv) If Ted survives the operation in Case 2 but not in Case 1, then Case 1 is much worse for Ted than Case 2 — it's as bad as death.
- (v) Case 1 isn't much worse than Case 2 for Ted.
- (vi) Therefore, both the modified Brain Theory and the Modified Psychology Theory are false.

Possible responses:

Parfit: identity doesn't matter.

Swinburne: "personal identity is distinct from, although evidenced by, similarity of memory and continuity of brain." (Swinburne, p. 326)

Me: "I WILL do such and such" means "I have a *continuer* in the future who does such and such"