

PROPERTIES

Ted Sider, Fall 2011, Mondays 11:15–1:10, Uris Hall 394
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This seminar will focus on “nonontic” issues about properties, especially properties in fundamental sciences. (Ontic issues—nominalism vs universals vs tropes—are mostly independent.) How monistic are these properties? Do they have their causal or nomic roles essentially? In virtue of what are they measurable by numbers?

Requirements

Seminar paper on a topic to be cleared with me.

Tentative schedule (First day of class: August 29)

(We won’t be covering everything in these readings. I’ll try to indicate the most central parts.)

1. Metaphysical Preliminaries: ontology, modality, fundamentality, intrinsicity. Quine (1948); Fine (1994, esp. pp. 1–10); Rosen (2010, esp. sections 1–3); Fine (2012, esp. sections 1–3) (see also Fine (2001)); Lewis (1983, 1986*a*, pp. 59–69); Sider (2011, chapters 1, 7, 12 but omit 12.3–12.4, 12.6, 12.8–12.10)
2. Formal preliminaries: measurement theory. Suppes and Zinnes (1963)
3. Numerical quantities: intro. Bigelow and Pargetter (1988)
4. Numerical quantities 1: comparativism. Field (1980, pp. ??, 1985); Bigelow and Pargetter (1990, pp. ??); Dasgupta (2012)
5. Numerical quantities 2: absolutism. Mundy (1987); Armstrong (1988, 1989, pp. ??); Skow (2007); Eddon (2012)
6. Numerical quantities 3: metaphysical functions. Weatherson (2009); Sider (2009)
7. Monism: Schaffer (2010*b*); Albert (1996); Hawthorne and Sider (2002); Turner (2010); Sider (2008); Schaffer (2010*a*); Zimmerman (2011)

8. Categoricalism: Lewis (1973, pp. 73–4; 1983, pp. 366–8; 1986*b*, pp. ix–xiii, 121–4; 1986*a*, p. 163; 1994); Armstrong (1978*a,b*, 1983, pp. ??); Black (2000); Lewis (2009); Schaffer (2005)
9. Causal essentialism: Shoemaker (1980); Swoyer (1982); Ellis and Lierse (1994); Hawthorne (2001); Bird (2007, pp. ??); Cross (2011)

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