

DUALIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

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Intro Metaphysics

Dualism Persons are composed of a physical body, which is only accidentally part of the person, and a non-physical soul, which is essential to the person.

1. Independence argument

Independence thesis Psychological and brain continuity are neither (jointly or individually) necessary nor sufficient for personal identity

1. We can conceive of all the combinations of psychological and brain continuity and personal identity
2. If we can conceive of all the combinations of psychological and brain continuity and personal identity, then the Independence Thesis is true
3. Therefore the Independence Thesis is true

Admittedly, there may be stories or beliefs which involve a hidden contradiction when initially they do not seem to do so. But the fact that there seems (and to so many people) to be no contradiction hidden in these stories is good reason for supposing that there is no contradiction hidden in them—until a contradiction is revealed. If this were not a good reason for believing there to be no contradiction, we would have no good reason for believing any sentence at all to be free of hidden contradiction. (Pp. 328-329)

2. From Independence to Dualism

3. The epistemological objection

1. If Dualism is true, then we have no knowledge of personal identity
2. But we *do* have some knowledge of personal identity
3. Therefore, Dualism is false

Epistemic argument against realism:

1. If realism is true then we have no knowledge of the external world
2. But we do have some knowledge of the external world
3. Therefore, realism is false.

4. The problem of interaction

Objection: souls can't causally interact with matter since they're nonphysical

Possible reply: psychophysical laws of nature

5. Souls are gratuitous

Objection: souls are not needed to account for the phenomena, so we shouldn't believe in them.