


SCHAFFER ON DEPENDENCE

Ted Sider
Metaphysical Structure

x grounds y iff y 's existence and nature is partly (rooted) in x 's existence and nature. Schaffer's picture: a great lattice of being:



1. What are the fundamental facts?

1.1 just substances



2. the whole lattice

Here, even though grounded entities aren't fundamental, they have to be mentioned in the fundamental facts.

More structure is now present at the fundamental level. Still, how does this diagram underlie "there's a city"? Reverse-engineering perhaps.

3. lattice + states of affairs

The entities in the lattice include states of affairs. But this requires further ideology. E.g.:

- primitive functor: 'the state of affairs of ϕ '

Schaffer's own view is more like this:

- primitive predicates: 'is a relation', 'instantiates'
- primitive functor: 'the state of affairs of $x_1 \dots$ standing in relation R '
- definition: R is natural iff R is a relation and nothing grounds R

4. Evaluation

- Purity-like objection: the whole story of the world surely must involve the lattice, yet that brings in nonsubstances.
- So much needed to be built in after 'ground'. So the theory's ultimate picture of reality is far more complex than it first seems.
- the theory essentially requires the states of affairs. otherwise (barring massive reverse engineering) there's just no way to get sentence-like information out of it.
- If the primitive functor allows 'the state of affairs of x 's being a city', then it violates purity, just like Fine's ground.
- Bias towards properties and relations/insufficient generality/hardwired realism about quantification

References

Schaffer, Jonathan (2009). "On What Grounds What." In David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), *Metametaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.